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On 24 June 2014 the General Affairs Council of the European Union approved the “European Union Maritime Security Strategy” (EUMSS), 
following the mandate by EU Heads of State or Government in their ‘Defence Summit’ last December and building on the Joint 
Communication “For An Open and Secure Global Maritime Domain” by the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy in early March. These documents come at a time of considerable transformations in ‘the world’s last global 
common’: the sea. 
 
A maritime strategy for the ‘European peninsula’ 
 
Being the westernmost ‘peninsula’ of the Eurasian continent, Europe was historically exposed to both opportunities and risks at its maritime 
borders, which deeply influenced the rise and fall of Europe’s past powers, from Ancient Rome to the British Empire. Nowadays European 
societies and economies are well-immersed in a largely sea-based system of global interdependence: according to the Commission, 90% of 
the EU’s external trade and 40% of its internal trade is transported across seas. The seas’ contribution to Europe’s welfare is nonetheless 
affected by a fragile maritime security outlook, marked by a combination of often interrelated threats including piracy, maritime disputes, 
human and drug trafficking, terrorism, overexploitation of marine ecosystems and catastrophes at sea. Recent episodes like the Lampedusa 
tragedy off the Italian coasts, the rise of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea or the face-off between Chinese and Vietnamese ships in the South 
China Sea provide just a few examples of such diverse challenges. 
 
Against this background, EU’s response followed a decade-long, incremental trend. While maritime piracy was first grasped as an emerging 
challenge by the 2003 European Security Strategy and its 2008 Implementation Report, some early attempts by the 2010 Spanish EU 
Presidency to promote a fully-fledged “Security Strategy for the global maritime domain” were resisted by other capitals, as well as the 
European Commission, due to the (too) narrow military scope of the exercise. A need was increasingly felt in several corners of the ‘EU 
house’ to combine the lessons learnt by some Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations and missions, like the 2008 
EUNAVFOR Atalanta and the 2012 EUCAP Nestor, but also by European participation in NATO naval operations such as the 2009 Ocean 
Shield, with EU’s internal policy demarches and legislation like the 2007 Commission Communication on an Integrated Maritime Policy and 
the 2005 EU Directive on Enhancing Port Security, thereby crafting an all-encompassing Strategy. This widespread belief was partially 
echoed by the 2012 Limassol Declaration and later endorsed by the December EU Summit. The opportunity was finally seized by the 
current Greek EU Presidency to lead the intergovernmental negotiations on the EUMSS via the ‘Friends of the Presidency’ Group, on the 
basis of the March Communication, and with a strong involvement by the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS). 
 
Definition, interests, risks and principles: setting the ‘polar stars’ of the EUMSS 
 
Concretely, the Strategy starts by setting some ‘polar stars’ for its practical deliverables. It first describes maritime security as a ‘state of 
affairs’ marked by law enforcement, freedom of navigation and protection of sea-related activities, assets and resources, thus opting for a 
‘policy-actionable’ rather than a legalistic definition. It then spells out EU’s interests, namely territorial security, international maritime 
cooperation and peace, protection of critical maritime infrastructure, freedom of navigation, protection of economic interests at sea, common 
situational awareness, effective management of EU’s maritime areas and external borders, and environmental security. 
 
The EUMSS then provides a catalogue of major maritime threats, including: use of force and external aggression against Member State 
rights, jurisdictions, citizens and interests; cross-border and organised crime such as pirates and smugglers of migrants, arms and drugs; 
sea-connected terrorism and other asymmetric challenges like cyber-crimes; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; threats to free 
navigation like obstruction of sea lanes; environmental risks, disasters, extreme events and climate change; and illegal archaeological 
activities at sea. 
 
Furthermore, the Strategy defines four guiding principles to address maritime security challenges: a cross-sectoral approach linking national 
civilian and military players – e.g. coast guards, navies, law enforcement and intelligence agencies – to EU bodies and the industry; 
functional integrity via a ‘bureaucracy-free’ approach capitalising on existing European structures, regulations and funding; respect for rules 
and principles of sea governance, with a strong emphasis on the dispute-settlement provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS); and maritime multilateralism as the guiding principle of EU’s engagement with international partners and organisations. 
 






‘Strategising’ maritime interdependence: internal and external aspects of the EUMSS 
 
The EUMSS ambitiously aims to ‘strategise’ the assumption of ‘maritime interdependence’ via concrete actions in five main areas of 
implementation. On external action, the EUMSS commits to a coordinated, comprehensive and visible EU approach, increasing coherence 
between European instruments and actors, mainstreaming maritime security in EU foreign policy, promoting UNCLOS worldwide and 
carrying out capacity-building in maritime governance, rule of law, transport security, border management and fight against illegal fishing, 
where the EU has developed niche expertise especially in Africa and the wider Indian Ocean. The Strategy also tackles maritime 
awareness, surveillance and information sharing by attempting to break a dangerous ‘silo approach’ among around 400 civilian and military 
surveillance authorities in Europe. These include through: cross-sectoral coordination and interoperability; cross-border surveillance 
cooperation and information exchange; consistency between EU’s internal approach and CSDP operations; and development of the 
Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE), a Commission-supported programme for cost-saving European interoperability. In 
capability development, the EUMSS insists on promoting ‘pooling and sharing’ exercises, identifying and developing dual-use and multi-
purpose capabilities for future missions based on stronger civilian-military synergies and EU-NATO coordination, and promoting greater 
dialogue among Europe’s sectoral fora. 
 
Further recommendations are also made by the Strategy on risk management, protection of critical infrastructure and crisis response, with 
the accent being put on developing EU-wide common risk analysis and cooperation-based adaptive actions, as well as on research, 
innovation, education and training, where the EUMSS calls inter alia for common Maritime Training Modules, a clearer vision for the future 
European civil-military research agenda, and private-public partnerships. 
 
Reversing ‘Mahan’s prophecy’: towards a brand-new ‘sea power’ for the EU? 
 
Overall, the EUMSS represents an encouraging development in EU’s often stagnating security debate. Admittedly, the Strategy remains 
diplomatically discreet on sensitive issues such as the unsolved maritime disputes in Eastern Mediterranean involving EU Members such as 
Cyprus and Greece and key neighbours like Turkey and Israel. It also treats the geographic prioritisation of EU’s maritime external borders 
carefully, due to rather diverging views such as between Europe’s northern and southern capitals. Again, it tackles EU’s autonomous military 
ambitions at sea cautiously, with some innovative options tabled by the March Communication, such as more regular ‘EU-flagged’ exercises 
with third countries or EU-owned dual-use assets, either being watered down or simply ruled out. 
 
Nevertheless, the Strategy manages to strike a very delicate balance between short-term and long-term priorities, combining the interests of 
coastal and non-coastal, as well as NATO and non-NATO Member States, bringing together the internal and external dimensions, as well 
as the civilian and military components of European maritime security. This makes the Strategy an ideal ‘litmus test’ for the very idea of EU’s 
‘policy comprehensiveness’ permeating the Lisbon Treaty, but it also entails that its conceivable impacts will require (at least) one decade to 
be fully assessed. Albeit being perhaps too specific to provide a proper ‘building block’ for the expected ‘strategic debate’ among EU leaders 
on global challenges and opportunities in late 2015, the EUMSS still provides a useful ‘prism’ through which Europeans can reflect together 
on several sea-related, yet wider foreign policy issues. These could be comprised of: the level of ambition of EU relations with maritime 
neighbours or Asia’s naval powers; political dialogue and operational coordination with NATO; intra-European cohesion in key multilateral 
fora such as the UN; and cooperation with emerging regional organisations involved in maritime security, like ASEAN and the African Union. 
 
The nature and policy implications of maritime security have significantly evolved in the past few decades. In The Influence of Sea Power 
upon History, US Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan confidently stated, back in 1890, that “The history of sea power is largely […] a 
narrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence frequently culminating in war”. Yet, today’s global maritime outlook is 
marked by such a material interdependence that widespread man-made or natural disruptions to secure and open seas can generate a 
ruinous ‘tragedy of the commons’. By further developing its EUMSS, the EU might help reversing Mahan’s bitter but well-grounded 
prophecy, and turn its common maritime interests into shared and global security responsibilities. 
 
Sailing the uncharted waters conducive to a brand-new and distinctively European ‘sea power’, promoting maritime governance through 
internal integration and external cooperation, will nonetheless demand sound ambitions and tangible endeavours. Future tests, to be tackled 
despite the Strategy’s ‘austerity mood’, include: consolidating a trust-based culture of intra-European security cooperation across the whole 
maritime spectrum while overcoming national or sector resistance; making fuller use of available political, security and development tools to 
shape a pro-active ‘EU maritime diplomacy’ vis-à-vis third countries and organisations; developing innovative and cross-domain civilian and 
military capabilities via collaborative European programmes and a cutting-edge industrial base; and exploiting the EUMSS as a public 
diplomacy tool to raise citizens’ awareness of EU’s role in security and defence. The EUMSS’ Action Plan, to be delivered by the end of this 
year under the auspices of the forthcoming Italian EU Presidency, ought then to provide the next ‘port of call’ of a much longer journey. 
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